This paper develops a theory of the relationship between the leverage ratios of banks and borrowers who take loans to purchase houses. The bank's payoff depends primarily on the value of the house that serves as collateral backing the loan. The analysis is in the context of a two-period model in which house prices and the capital structure decisions of banks and borrowers are endogenized. There are four main results. First, leverage is a "positively correlated" phenomenon in that high leverage among borrowers is positively correlated with high leverage among banks. Both borrower and bank leverage are higher when house prices are higher. Second, higher bank leverage leads to greater volatility of house prices in response to shocks to fundamental house values. Third, a bank's exposure to credit risk depends not only on its own leverage choice but also on the leverage decisions of other banks. Fourth, positive fundamental shocks to house prices dilute financial intermediation by reducing banks' pre-lending screening. Although the model is developed in the context of the housing market, it is applicable in any borrower-lender setting in which collateral values depend on the aggregate availability of credit, and credit risk in turn depends significantly on collateral values. Empirical and policy implications of the analysis are drawn out.
higher. This, in contrast to our second main result, highlights a reverse transmission mechanism, whereby fundamental shocks to house prices in the real sector reverberate in the nature of financial intermediation via the screening decisions of banks.
In addition to these main results, the analysis allows us to examine a host of other issues, such as the manner in which house price cycles can emerge from the capital structure adjustments of banks to initial exogenous-shock-driven changes in house prices, how exogenous shocks to bank capital -say due to losses on unrelated investments -can affect house price dynamics, how ex ante capital requirements compare with ex post capital infusions by the government when banks are hit with a negative shock, and the effect of ex ante heterogeneity among banks with large banks receiving too-big-to-fail protection that small banks do not receive.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 develops the model. Section 4 contains the preliminaries for the analysis, including definition of the equilibrium.
Section 5 contains the main analysis. Section 6 considers extensions. It explores how house prices induce intermediation thinning, the manner in which bank leverage choices respond to house prices and how this in turn contributes to house price cycles, the impact of exogenous bank capital shocks on house price dynamics, the regulatory choice between ex ante capital requirements and ex post capital infusions, and the impact of cross-sectional heterogeneity among banks. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the empirical implications. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Related Literature
The purpose of this section is to briefly review various strands of the literature that are related to our work. There is a vast literature on bank capital that we will touch upon only briefly here because its relationship to our work is mostly tangential. 3 For example, there is a significant theoretical literature on bank capital requirements and their effects (e.g., Furlong and Keeley (1990) , Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) , Kim and Santomero (1988) , Koehn and Santomero (1980) , and Thakor (1996) ). Empirically, some of the predictions of these models have been tested and the effects of changes to the capital requirements regime on banks' portfolios have been examined 3 There are also numerous papers on the capital structure decisions of banks (e.g., Inderst and Mueller (2008) , and Mehran and Thakor (forthcoming)). However, these too are not directly related to our paper because they do not examine the interaction between banks' and borrowers' leverage dynamics.
(e.g., Bernanke and Lown (1991) , and Thakor (1996) ). Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox (1995) study the dynamic response of U.S. banks to shocks to their capital and show that these banks adjust their capital ratios faster than they adjust their loan portfolios. See Rochet (2008) for a review.
What distinguishes our paper from this literature is that our focus is not on the determination of regulatory capital requirements. What we are interested in is how bank leverage ratios respond to changes in borrowers' leverage ratios when loans are secured by collateral whose future value is dependent on aggregate bank credit supply. This paper is also related to the literature on real estate and household finance. Stein (1995) theoretically examines how down payment restriction affects both the house prices and the trading volume in the real estate market. Lamont and Stein (1999) provide empirical evidence for the Stein (1995) model and find that house prices in U.S. cities where more homeowners take loans with higher loan-to-value ratios are more sensitive to city-specific shocks. Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) extend Stein's (1995) analysis to a life-cycle model of the housing market and demonstrate a correlation between house prices and the incomes of young households that are eager to climb a property ladder but are credit-constrained. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a dynamic model in which lenders cannot force borrowers to repay unless debt is secured. Consequently, durable assets serve not only as factors of production but also as collateral for loans. The dynamic interaction between credit limits and asset prices leads to temporary shocks to technology or income becoming persistent shocks to asset prices. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) provide evidence that at the onset of a recession borrowers facing high agency costs receive a relatively lower share of the credit extended and hence account for a proportionally greater part of the decline in economic activity. Chen (2001) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model which explains why banking crises so often coincide with depressed prices in asset markets. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) study how leverage cycles can cause contagion, flight to collateral and issuance rationing in a so-called "anxious economy." 4 Elul (2008) shows how a drop in the value of the underlying collateral in secured borrowing may help stabilize aggregate fluctuations in the housing market. 5 None of them, 4 There are also papers that examine frictions and the consequent amplification of shocks. See Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004) , and Kocherlakota (2000) . 5 There are also numerous papers on the Swedish banking crisis that discuss crisis solutions that have some similarity to those we discuss. See, for example, Went (2009) .
however, studies the relationship between borrower leverage and bank leverage or bank leverage price effects as we do.
The following papers are more closely related to ours. In Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , collateral value depends on other industry peers' ability to buy the asset. 6 The similarity is that in our model the future house price depends on a future borrower's ability to purchase the house. However, our focus differs substantially in that we link the future borrower's ability to purchase the house to the bank's future ability to lend, and examine how this, in turn depends on the capital structure decisions of banks in the current period. Another related paper is Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in which the capital of the bank interacts with the capital of the borrower. Moral hazard prevents low-capital borrowers from being able to raise unmonitored finance. Banks can provide monitoring and hence not only extend credit to these borrowers but also enhance their ability to obtain credit from elsewhere. However, banks need to have sufficient capital of their own to have incentives to monitor. Thus, access to credit may depend on capital in both banks and borrowers. However, unlike our paper, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) take the capital levels of the bank and the borrower as exogenous and do not address why their leverage ratios may be correlated. Moreover, they also do not address the impact of these leverage ratios on the housing market. That is, the focus of their paper is different from ours.
Acharya and Viswanathan (forthcoming) develop a model in which more highly-levered financial institutions (e.g., broker-dealers) are more likely to face difficulty in rolling over their short-term debt contingent upon adverse shocks, and hence delever by selling assets to other lower-leverage firms in the sector when hit with an adverse shock. This delevering leads to greater asset price deterioration, and sometimes drying-up of liquidity. We examine a different set of issues in the context of the housing market in that, unlike Acharya and Viswanathan (forthcoming), we focus on the correlation between borrower and bank leverage and endogenize both equity and debt in characterizing bank leverage. 6 Benmelech and Bergman's (2009) evidence from bankruptcies in the airline industry is consistent with this.
See also the literature on "cash-in-the-market" pricing (e.g., Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008a) , Allen and Carletti (2008) , and Allen and Gale (2005) 3 The Model
The agents and economic environment
Consider a three-date (t = 1, 2, and 3) economy with universal risk neutrality. 8 There are two goods in the economy, money and houses, where money is the numeraire good and can be stored costlessly over time, and houses are indivisible. There is a continuum of atomistic and identical houses available in the market at t = 1 with Lebesgue measure of S. There are no new houses built after t = 1. We call the period between t = 1 and t = 2 the first period, and the period between t = 2 and t = 3 the second period. We normalize discount rates between dates to zero.
There is also a continuum of atomistic consumers in each period. Consumers within a given period are identical, but they may differ across periods. A consumer in period i ∈ {1, 2} is born at t = i without a house but with a monetary endowment M i > 0, and earns an income X i at t = i + 1. She maximizes her expected utility at t = i given by:
where h i is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the consumer owns a house in period i and zero otherwise, B i > 0 is the consumer's utility from home ownership in period i, and C i and C i+1 are, respectively, the consumer's monetary consumptions at t = i and t = i + 1. E(·) is the expectation operator.
7 With respect to our result on bank interconnectedness, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008b) show that banks may undertake correlated investments and minimize the impact of information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing. 8 We add an additional date t = 0 in Section 5.3 to analyze bank entry to the industry.
The measure of consumers in each period, S c , exceeds the total housing supply in that period, i.e., S c > S. Each consumer born at date t takes the house price at date t as given and decides whether to buy a house or not. First-period consumers who buy houses at t = 1 sell their houses to some second-period consumers at t = 2, who in turn sell theirs to some (unmodeled) third-period consumers at t = 3, and so on. 9 The house price at t = 3, P 3 ≥ 0, is exogenously given but random with probability density function f when viewed at t = 1 and 2. At t = 1, a (first-period)
consumer's utility from home ownership in the first period, B 1 , is known to everyone, whereas a (second-period) consumer's utility from home ownership in the second period, B 2 , is a random variable that realizes its value at t = 2. B 2 takes a high value, B 2h , with probability θ, and a low value, B 2l , with probability 1 − θ, where B 2h > B 2l > 0. This is the only fundamental uncertainty in the housing market. Note that in any given period i, all consumers attach the same value, B i , to home ownership in that period. The house prices at t = 1 and 2, P 1 and P 2 , are endogenously determined by competition among the first-period and second-period consumers for buying the fixed housing supply, S, at t = 1 and 2, respectively. 10 Buying and selling houses involve no transaction costs. It is clear that in the absence of wealth and credit constraints, the house price at t = 2 will be P 2 = B 2 + E(P 3 ), and the house price at t = 1 will be
However, consumers are wealth constrained, and their monetary endowments are not large enough to finance home purchases at those prices. Specifically, Assumption 1. Consumers' wealth endowments at dates t = 1 (M 1 ) and t = 2 (M 2 ) are not large enough to completely finance house purchases. That is, M 1 ∈ (0, B 1 + E(B 2 + P 3 )) and M 2 ∈ (0, B 2 + E(P 3 )). 9 The initial housing stock is owned by a generation of consumers that we do not explicitly analyze in the model.
These consumers exit the model at t = 1 with either a capital gain or a capital loss, depending on the house price at t = 1. Alternatively, we could think of the initial housing stock as having been created by builders who financed the construction with their own equity and who exit the model at t = 1 with either a gain or loss on their investment based on the housing price at t = 1. In either case, the payoffs of house sellers at t = 1 are irrelevant to our analysis. 10 We assume that housing supply is inelastic and focus on the interaction between housing demand and credit availability. The assumption facilitates the result that housing prices fall as credit constraints worsen. This result also obtains in Stein (1995) . Vigdor (2006) shows that this result holds even when housing supply is elastic.
Consumers can borrow from banks by taking mortgage loans, but cannot directly borrow and lend money to each other or get funding from any other source. 11 There is a continuum of atomistic and ex ante identical banks with a measure of S/N , where N is a positive constant. In period i, each bank takes the size of loans demanded by the consumers (L i ) and the interest rate on loans (R i ) as given, and chooses the number of loans to extend. Bank j extends n ij loans in period i. All loans are for one period: a loan extended at date t (t = 1 or 2) must be repaid at date t + 1. The population of banks across the two periods does not change, so new banks do not enter at t = 2.
The consumer can choose whether or not to repay her loan. To minimize the risk of default as well as the loss given default, banks require that each loan be secured by the house purchased using that loan. If a consumer does not repay her loan in full, the bank can seize her house (i.e., foreclose) without any cost and sell it through a foreclosure auction at the prevailing market price of the house. 12 The bank has no legal claim on the borrower's other assets or income, and similarly the borrower has no legal claim on the bank's proceeds from the sale of the foreclosed house.
We now make an assumption about the relationship between the borrower's first-period endowment (M 1 ) and the first-period utility from home ownership (B 1 ).
Assumption 2.
The difference between the first-period consumer's monetary endowment and utility from home ownership, M 1 − B 1 , is strictly positive but not too high. That is,
whereū is an upper bound.
If M 1 − B 1 ≤ 0, then all first-period consumers strictly prefer to purchase a house regardless of the loan terms, and the housing market will never clear. Assuming M 1 > B 1 eliminates this possibility. To understand the role played by the upper bound,ū, on M 1 − B 1 , note that the size and risk of bank loans are determined by the consumers' monetary endowment (the explicit expression forū is in the Appendix). If the first-period consumers have sufficiently high monetary endowments, bank loans are relatively small and therefore riskless. The capital structure decision of a bank is trivial in this case. The bank relies only on deposits because it incurs no cost with riskless deposits, whereas equity is costly. We are interested in the more realistic situation in which there is a positive probability that the bank defaults on its deposit obligations and incurs the associated 11 This assumption can be justified on the basis of the specialization of banks as information processors (e.g., Allen
(1990), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) ). 12 In reality, banks will incur some foreclosure cost and may only get a fraction of the market price of the house in a foreclosure auction. Adding these details into the model does not qualitatively change our results.
default cost (which arises from an increase in its cost of lending in the second period; see Section 3.2). It is this cost that the bank trades off against the cost of equity in determining its first-period capital structure.
Bank capital structure
Banks extend loans using the funds they raise through equity capital and deposits. Each bank independently chooses the amount of equity and deposits on its balance sheet. We endogenously determine banks' capital structure choices in the first period, but take their optimal capital structure choices as given in the second period. 13 Let E j and D j be the amount of equity and deposits per loan, respectively, raised by bank j in the first period. In the first period, deposits are in elastic supply and fully insured, so the deposit interest rate is zero. Raising equity capital is costly. This cost may arise due to capital market frictions of various sorts such as asymmetric information (e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984) ) and the transaction costs of raising equity. 14 Specifically, bank j's cost of equity capital in the first period is Λ(n 1j E j ), an increasing and convex function with
Since capital is costly and banks do not have any other investment opportunities, no bank will raise more funds than needed to finance its loan. That is,
A bank defaults when it cannot repay its depositors in full. In this case, deposit insurance covers the shortfall, which allows the bank to continue to operate in the next period. The deposit insurance is fairly priced ($1 for each $1 of expected loss). However, default increases the cost of lending for banks in the subsequent period. Specifically, if bank j does not default in the first period, its faces a cost of Q(K) to raise an amount K of funds (equity and deposits) in the second period 13 Our main result on correlated leverage focuses on the first-period bank leverage. Explicitly considering banks' capital structure choices in the second period substantially complicates the mathematical analysis but does not offer additional insights. In a previous version of the paper, we had endogenously solved for the second-period capital structure choices of banks, and encountered results qualitatively similar to those reported here. However, note that taking the bank's second-period capital structure as given does not require it to be the same as the first-period capital structure.
14 The assumption that bank equity capital is costly is fairly standard. See, for example, Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (forthcoming), and Mehran and Thakor (forthcoming). However, as Mehran and Thakor (forthcoming) show, capital may still have net benefits.
under a profit-maximizing capital structure (which we take as given and do not model explicitly), where Q(K) is an increasing and convex function with Q(0) = Q (0) = 0. 15 However, this cost rises to Q(K) + αn 1j (D j − P 2 ) + K if the bank defaults in the first period, where α is a positive constant and z + denotes the maximum of z and 0. Note that n 1j (D j − P 2 ) + is bank j's deposit repayment shortfall in the first period. Thus, the bank's second-period marginal cost of lending increases by αn 1j (D j − P 2 ) + if it defaults in the first period. 16 The rationale for this is that banking defaults make it more difficult for banks to raise equity capital to replace what is wiped out by these losses, so raising capital becomes more costly. 17 The cost of debt financing may increase as well, even though there is deposit insurance. The reason is that the bank may face higher marketing costs to convince depositors to return to a bank in which depositors' claims had to be settled by the deposit insurer. 18 That is, we assume:
Assumption 3. A bank's default in the first period increases its marginal cost of lending in the second period, but not by too much. That is, α ∈ (0, α max ). 15 Note that although the second-period bank capital structure is not modeled explicitly, its effect on lending is captured by the cost function Q(·). The assumption that the cost of lending is independent of the fundamental shock in the housing market (i.e., the realization of B2) is for simplicity. In reality, a bank's second-period optimal capital structure would be contingent on the realization of B2, and its cost of lending would be affected by this capital structure. Our analysis can accommodate this under an alternative specification in which the lending cost is Q h (K) when B2 = B 2h , and Q l (K) when B2 = B 2l , where Q h (K) = Q l (K). 16 Note that under this specification when the bank does not default, i.e., Dj < P2, the bank's retained earnings in the first period do not affect its second-period cost of lending. One perhaps would expect that retained earnings enable the bank to rely less on outside financing in the second period, which would effectively lower its cost of funds, since internal funds (retained earnings) are typically cheaper than external funds (e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984) ).
Allowing first-period positive profits to lower the second-period cost of funding for the bank would only strengthen our results, as we discuss later in Section 5. can lead to a decline in lending. Bernanke (1983) shows that financial market disruptions in the U.S. during 1930-33 reduced the effectiveness of the financial sector and increased the cost of credit intermediation. Watanabe (2007) shows that Japanese banks cut back lending after incurring large losses in 1990s. Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2005) and Ashcraft (2006) show that the process of resolving failed banks reduces liquidity and bank lending. 18 Formally, this can be modeled by introducing an "inconvenience cost" for depositors because they have to wait to be paid by the deposit insurer rather than being able to withdraw their deposits on demand. Introducing such a cost does not affect the analysis.
A positive α means that a bank's second-period marginal cost of lending increases when it defaults in the first-period. The upper bound on α, called α max , means that the increase in a bank's second-period lending cost following its first-period default is not too high (see Appendix for the expression for α max ). The main reason for making this assumption is to preclude a situation in which the bank's financing friction (a higher second-period marginal cost of funding contingent upon first-period default) by itself becomes the dominant factor in the determination of the secondperiod house price. 19 Each bank maximizes its expected second-period profit at t = 2 by choosing the number of loans to extend. At t = 1, each bank chooses the number of loans and the first-period capital structure to maximize the sum of its expected profits in both periods, taking into account the effect of default in the first period on its cost of lending in the second period. In each period, banks take the size of a loan and loan interest rate as given (which are determined under a competitive equilibrium as explained in Section 4.6), since each bank is atomistic. 20 The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 goes here] 19 In addition, if the increase in the second-period lending cost following first-period default exceeds the amount of first-period deposit shortfall, then banks may have a perverse incentive to manipulate the house price by "forgiving" the borrower's indebtedness. Moreover, if banks can not coordinate their actions, multiple equilibria can arise. In one equilibrium, everyone expects house price to be high so banks do not default and their consequent low cost of lending in the second period sustains such high price. In another equilibrium, expectation of low house price causes banks to default in the first period and their second-period cost of lending to increase, eventually leading to low house price and bank default in the first period. This self-fulfilling bank default may occur even when the housing market receives a positive shock at t = 2 (i.e., B2 = B 2h ) if α is sufficiently large. In this scenario, government policies may be able to credibly alter beliefs and lead to a socially desirable equilibrium. Such considerations may have motivated U.S. government programs such as liquidity assistance to banks and direct support for mortgage markets. We thank Matt Pritsker for suggesting these issues. Imposing an upper bound on α eliminates this possibility. 20 The size of each loan is determined by the amount that a homebuyer needs to borrow, and is not directly influenced by the bank. A bank can, however, determine the amount it lends by choosing the number of loans (which can be any positive, possibly non-integral number). If a borrower's loan is financed by multiple banks, a bank's fraction of the loan repayment equals the fraction of the borrower loan that the bank provided.
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This section presents essential preliminaries for an analysis of the model. We begin by providing an example that illustrates the key intuition of the result on correlated leverage. Next, we examine trading in the housing market, describe the bank's expected profits in the two periods, analyze the determination of the bank's first-period capital structure, and analyze equilibrium in the loan market in terms of the number of loans the bank chooses to make. We subsequently define the overall equilibrium.
An example showing that higher house prices lead to higher consumer leverage and bank leverage
We now provide a simple example to illustrate the equilibrium as well as to serve as a preamble to the core idea of the paper, correlated leverage, which we will analyze more formally in the following sections. In this example, second-period house prices are perfectly correlated with the second-period value of home ownership, B 2 . Hence, the second-period house price P 2 is a binary random variable: with probability θ it is P 2h > 0 which is assumed to be sufficiently large to cover the contractually stipulated loan repayment, and with probability 1− θ it is P 2l which is normalized to zero. 21 We assume: (i) the cost of equity for a bank with equity capital y in the first period is Λ(y) = λy 2 /2, where λ > 0 is a constant, (ii) each dollar of deposit repayment shortfall imposes a deadweight cost of δ > 0 dollars on the bank, and (iii) the measure of banks equals the measure of houses (i.e., N = 1). We normalize the first-period consumers' income to zero (i.e., X 1 = 0). Each consumer's expected utility at t = 1 is given by:
Here B 1 is the value attached to home ownership by first-period consumers, R 1 is the gross interest rate charged by the bank, L 1 is the size of the loan, and M 1 is the consumer's monetary endowment. 21 In the more general model, P2 will be affected by B2 as well as the cost of credit for second-period homebuyers, which will be affected by first-period loan losses suffered by banks. These complications in the determination of P2
are absent in this example. Moreover, this example only analyzes a one-period problem, where each bank takes P 2h
and P 2l as exogenously given and maximizes its expected profit in the first period (instead of the sum of the profits in two periods as stated in the formal model). Our subsequent analysis of the model deals with a two-period problem.
In equilibrium, demand must equal supply in the housing market, i.e., the first-period consumers must be indifferent between buying a house and not buying one:
We now analyze how banks choose capital structure. Consider bank j. It extends n 1j loans at t = 1, each of size L 1 . It chooses equity per loan, E j , and deposits per loan, D j , to maximize the expected net payoff to shareholders at t = 1: 22
Thus, the first-order-condition for a profit-maximizing capital structure for the bank is:
Each bank also chooses the number of loans it extends (n 1j ) to maximize its expected profit (5) in that period. Bank j's first-order-condition for a profit-maximizing choice of n 1j is:
where E j satisfies (6) . Since the measure of banks equals the measure of houses, each bank extends one loan in a symmetric equilibrium:
From equations (4), (6), (7) and (8), we can solve for the equilibrium:
Each consumer's leverage is:
22 To understand (5), note that θR1L1 − L1 − δ[1 − θ]Dj is the bank's expected profit per loan, which equals the expected loan repayment, θR1L1, net of the loan extended, L1, and the expected deadweight cost of default,
It is clear from (12) and (13) that both consumer leverage and bank leverage are increasing in θ, the probability of a higher future house price. Thus, bank leverage is high precisely when consumer leverage is high. This is the correlated leverage result that we pursue in this paper. A greater probability of a higher future house price makes home ownership more attractive, causing an increase in current house price that requires homebuyers to borrow more. At the same time, banks increase leverage because they perceive a lower probability (1 − θ) of loan default.
The bank leverage result does not rely on any specific assumptions about the nature of financing costs, i.e., the convex cost of equity and the linear cost of debt. To see this, suppose the cost of debt is also quadratic so that bank j incurs a cost of δ[n 1j D j ] 2 /2 when it defaults on its debt n 1j D j . Since the probability of default is 1−θ, the bank's expected cost of debt is
By equating the marginal costs of equity and debt, the bank chooses a debt-equity ratio of λ{δ[1−θ]} −1 , which is increasing in θ (and independent of the loan size). In this example, we assume a linear cost of debt to simplify, and a convex cost of equity to obtain a unique profit-maximizing bank capital structure.
In what follows, we analyze correlated leverage more formally. In particular, we endogenize the cost of default to the bank through its adverse impact on the bank's subsequent lending. This analysis also allows us to endogenize the second-period house price and hence illuminates another key issue that we examine in this paper: the effect of bank leverage on house prices.
Housing market and the determination of equilibrium house prices
Our goal in this subsection is to examine how the equilibrium house prices are determined in the first and the second periods. House prices are determined by competition among consumers to buy a limited supply of houses in period i:
23 Note that bank leverage is defined as debt over total assets, whereas consumer leverage is defined as debt over equity. These are essentially equivalent definitions from the standpoint of our model.
the following loan amount from a bank: 24
Let R i > 1 be the gross interest rate charged by the bank (which will be endogenously determined later) in period i. This rate is independent of the identity of the consumer or the bank because of our assumption of identical consumers and identical banks. The expected utility of a consumer from buying a house at t = i consists of the utility from home ownership in period i (B i ), her income at
, and the expected gain from house price appreciation in period i after paying off the bank loan (which is the maximum of zero and the excess of the house price at t = i + 1, P i+1 , over the repayment to the bank, R i L i ):
The expected utility of a consumer who does not buy a house equals her endowment (M i ) plus her income (X i ):
The demand of houses at t = i is:
In equilibrium, we need to have House Demand i = House Supply i , so consumers are indifferent between purchasing a house and not purchasing one:
This equation is the consumer's indifference condition that determines the equilibrium house price P i taking the interest rate R i as given. Note that the left-hand-side (LHS) of (19) is the monetary consumption that the consumer gives up in buying a house, and its right-hand-side (RHS) consists of the utility from home ownership in period i and the expected gain from house price appreciation in 24 Note that the loan size, Li, cannot be negative in equilibrium because Assumption 1 rules out Pi ≤ Mi.
period i after paying off the bank loan. The competition in the housing market uniquely determines the loan repayment amount R i L i , but not the house price P i = L i + M i , which also depends on the interest rate R i charged by the banks. An increase in R i dampens the demand for houses, so housing market equilibrium is restored with a lower P i .
The bank's expected profits
In this subsection, we describe the bank's expected profits in the first and second periods, as a prelude to examining the bank's optimal capital structure in the first period.
The first-period expected profit
Bank j's first-period realized profit (depending on the realization of P 2 ) is given by:
There are two terms in π 1j . The first term equals the number of loans the bank chooses to make, n 1j , multiplied by the repayment from the consumer per loan, min(P 2 , R 1 L 1 ), net of the deposit payment, D j , the cost of (fairly priced) deposit insurance, E((D j − min(P 2 , R 1 L 1 )) + ), and the equity capital raised, E j . Note that deposit insurance makes the depositors' claim riskless, and since the riskless rate is zero, the bank's promised repayment to depositors is equal to the amount of deposits raised, D j . The consumer's repayment on each loan equals min(P 2 , R 1 L 1 ) because the consumer, when facing a choice of paying her loan obligation (R 1 L 1 ) or forfeiting her house (worth P 2 ), chooses the option that costs her the least. 25 The second term in π 1j is the deduction for the cost of equity capital, Λ(n 1j E j ). Taking the expected value of π 1j and simplifying, we get the bank's first-period expected profit: 26
The second-period expected profit
The second-period outcomes are contingent on the realization of B 2 . We introduce subscript k ∈ {h, l} to denote the state in which
, and E(π 2jk ) 25 A consumer who chooses to repay the loan may sell the house to do so. 26 The simplification uses the following facts: z + − (−z) + = z with z = min(P2, R1L1) − Dj , and Dj + Ej = L1.
are the second-period house price, loan size, loan interest rate, the number of loans extended by bank j, and bank j's expected second-period profit, respectively. We can write E(π 2jk ) as:
The expected profit equals the repayment from borrowers, n 2jk E(min(P 3 , R 2k L 2k )), net of the funds raised, n 2jk L 2k , and the cost of funds. The cost of funds includes Q(n 2jk L 2k ) plus the increase in the lending cost due to the first-period default, given by a fraction αn 1j (D j −P 2k ) + of the second-period loan amount (n 2jk L 2k ). Viewed at t = 1, the bank's expected second-period profit is:
4.4 Bank capital structure in the first period
As indicated earlier, we will endogenously solve for the bank's first-period capital structure, while taking its second-period optimal capital structure as given. The bank's capital structure choice in the first period affects its cost of lending in the second period, so the bank takes second-period cash flows into account when choosing its first-period capital structure at t = 1. The first-ordercondition for a (first-period) capital structure that maximizes the bank's total expected profits in the two periods, E(π 1j ) + E(π 2j ), is: 27
If the bank's first-period capital structure does not impact its second-period payoffs (α = 0), then the bank finances its first-period loan entirely with deposits to avoid raising costly equity capital.
However, since α > 0 by Assumption 3, the bank's default on its first-period deposit obligations increases its second-period cost of lending and this represents an indirect cost of using excessive deposits. The optimal capital structure trades off the direct cost of equity against the indirect cost of deposits.
Note that dE(π 2j )/dD j = ∂E(π 2j )/∂D j , because each bank is atomistic and its own capital structure choice in the first period will not affect P 2 or L 2 , but may impact the number of loans 27 Since P2 has a discrete probability distribution, the first-order-condition may not hold if Dj = P 2l or Dj = P 2h .
The first possibility requires riskless bank deposits and is ruled out by Assumption 2, and the second possibility requires the loan to be risky and yet completely financed by deposits, which is not optimal (see (25) ).
it extends in the second period. However, the bank's second-period choices maximize its expected profit in that period, so the Envelope Theorem applies. From (22) and (23), we have 
Note that in choosing its optimal capital structure, each bank takes the terms of the loan and the house price distribution as given.
Loan market
We now solve for equilibrium in the loan market. The aggregate demand for loans is the measure of consumers who purchase houses:
Consumers' demand for houses depends both on the loan interest rate and the house price. When the housing market is in equilibrium, competition among consumers ensures that the equilibrium house price adjusts so that the measure of consumers who purchase houses equals the supply of houses S and the housing market clears. Thus, the aggregate demand for bank loans equals the measure of houses when the housing market is in equilibrium. The aggregate supply of loans in period i is given by:
where n ij is the number of loans made in equilibrium by bank j in period i. Bank j's first-ordercondition for a choice of n 2jk , the number of loans it extends in the second-period when B 2 = B 2k , that maximizes its expected second-period profit (22) , is:
The left-hand-side (LHS) of the equation is the expected repayment by the borrower on the marginal loan net of the loan amount, and the right-hand-side (RHS) is the marginal cost of lending for the bank. The convex cost Q results in a marginal cost of lending for the bank that is increasing in the number of second-period loans, n 2jk . An increase in the second-period loan interest rate R 2k or a decrease in the second-period loan size L 2k raises the bank's marginal return from each loan above the marginal cost of the loan and causes banks to lend more until the marginal return and marginal cost become equal. Thus, each bank's supply of loans is increasing in R 2k and decreasing in L 2k , as is the aggregate supply of loans.
Bank j's first-order-condition for a choice of the number of first-period loans, n 1j , to maximize the sum of its first-period and second-period expected profits, E(π 1j ) + E(π 2j ), is:
. Substituting it into (29), we get:
Equilibrium in the loan market requires that the loan interest rate is such that Loan Demand i equals Loan Supply i in period i. The reason for this is the standard market-clearing argument for equilibrium. 29 Equating the equilibrium demand for loans S to the supply (27) , in a symmetric equilibrium with identical banks, we must have:
29 To see this, first consider an interest rate Ri (where R2 ∈ {R 2h , R 2l }, depending on the realized value of B2) such that Loan Supply i exceeds the Loan Demandi. This means that there is a positive measure of banks that are extending less than their profit-maximizing number of loans. This cannot be an equilibrium because these banks can increase their expected profits by charging a rate marginally lower than Ri and thereby attracting increased consumer demand for their loans. Now, consider an interest rate Ri such that Loan Supply i is less than the Loan Demandi.
This means that there are some consumers who do not get loans even though they strictly prefer to get loans at the prevailing interest rate. This cannot be an equilibrium either because a bank can tap part of the unsatisfied demand to increase its expected profit by extending more loans at an interest rate marginally higher than Ri. In what follows, our definition of equilibrium includes incentive-compatibility conditions for banks' choices of the number of loans to extend and capital structure, but not for the loan interest rate which is determined by the market-clearing condition above. Nonetheless, no bank wishes to deviate from the interest rate at which loan demand and supply are equated.
At this rate, each bank extends its profit-maximizing number of loans and its expected profit is positive because the bank has the option of earning zero profit by not extending any loans. Now, if a bank charges a rate higher than Ri, there will be no demand for its loans and its profit will drop to zero. If it charges a rate less than Ri, the marginal revenue from each loan will decline, so the bank will not only optimally reduce the number of loans it extends but also earn lower expected profits on the remaining loans. So, it is incentive compatible for each bank to charge Ri.
Thus, the number of loans made by each bank equals N , where N is the ratio of the measure of consumers (S) over the measure of banks (S/N ).
The Equilibrium
We now define the equilibrium involving house prices in both periods, loan sizes and interest rates, consumer leverage, and the bank's first-period capital structure choice.
Definition of Equilibrium: A competitive rational expectations equilibrium consists of the house
, and the interest rates (R 1 , R 2h , R 2l ) in each state (first period or second period with realization of B 2h or B 2l ), and the amount of bank deposits and equity capital per loan in the first period (D j and E j , respectively), such that:
1. Each consumer chooses whether to buy a house (expected utility in (16)) or not (expected utility in (17)) to maximize her expected utility, taking the house price and the loan interest rate as given. The consumer's choice to buy a house in any period determines the consumer's capital structure in that period, given the loan size and the consumer's endowment.
2. Each bank, indexed j, chooses the number of loans it extends in the second period (n 2jk ) to maximize its expected profit (22) conditional on realization of B 2k , where k ∈ {h, l}, taking the loan interest rate (R 2k ) and the loan size (L 2k ) as given. In the first period, each bank j chooses the number of first-period loans (n 1j ) to make and its capital structure (D j and E j ), subject to (2), to maximize the total expected profits from both periods.
3. In each period, banks and consumers form (rational) expectations about the future house price and the actions of other banks and consumers that are consistent with the equilibrium actions of banks and consumers and the expected future house price.
4. The loan size and each consumer's monetary endowment are just sufficient to allow a consumer to buy a house (see (15)).
5. House demand (18) equals house supply (14) , and loan demand (26) equals loan supply (27) .
The equilibrium house prices P i , loan interest rates R i , and banks' first-period equity and deposits per loan, E j and D j , are jointly determined by the consumer's indifference condition (19) , the bank's optimal capital structure condition (25) , the bank's optimal loan amount conditions ( (28) and (30)), and the loan market clearing condition (31) .
In this section we analyze the equilibrium defined in the previous section and derive three of our four main results. In the usual dynamic programming manner, we use backward induction and begin with the second period first.
Equilibrium in the second period
The main variables of interest are the second-period equilibrium house price and the impact of the equilibrium house price on the credit risk exposures of banks with respect to their first-period loans.
Our first result deals with the relationship between the equilibrium house price and the value of the fundamental shock, B 2 .
5.1.1 Shock to fundamentals and the second-period house price Lemma 1. The equilibrium house price at t = 2, P 2 , is increasing in the second-period consumer's utility from home ownership in the second period, B 2 .
As the consumer's utility from home ownership, B 2 , increases, buying houses becomes more attractive if house price and interest rates do not change. The demand for houses exceeds the fixed supply of houses. Equilibrium is restored with an increase in the second-period house price and the loan interest rate.
Bank leverage and the second-period house price
Next, we examine how the first-period leverage choices of banks affect the second-period house price.
The following result is a comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium about the consequence of higher bank leverage in the first period for the second-period house price. Proposition 1. Suppose the housing market experiences a negative fundamental shock (B 2 = B 2l )
at t = 2. The higher the equilibrium bank leverage chosen at t = 1, the greater is the decline in the second-period house price P 2l . Conditional on a positive fundamental shock (B 2 = B 2h ), however, the house price P 2h is unaffected by the bank leverage chosen at t = 1. Thus, higher bank leverage leads to higher volatility in the equilibrium second-period house price.
Note that the bank's leverage choice at t = 1 was based on the probability distribution of B 2 .
Proposition 1 deals with how, conditional on this earlier leverage choice, the equilibrium house price at t = 2 responds to the actual realization of the fundamental shock, B 2 . The intuition for this result is that the higher a bank's first-period leverage, the higher is the volatility of its first-period profit at t = 2, which means the higher is the volatility of the bank's second-period loan terms, since these are affected by the bank's first-period profits; these loan terms then affect second-period housing demand and price. To see why this happens, note that higher leverage causes a bank's first-period profit to increase conditional on a positive shock (B 2 = B 2h ) because higher leverage replaces equity with deposits which are ex post cheaper in the event of a positive fundamental shock.
However, higher leverage also causes the bank to default by a greater amount when the housing market suffers a negative fundamental shock (B 2 = B 2l ) at t = 2. That is, higher bank leverage amplifies the adverse impact of the negative fundamental shock in the housing market by increasing the amount of bank default on deposits. As a result, the lending cost of the bank in the second period increases, leading to a higher second-period loan interest rate. But this lowers the secondperiod consumers' demand for loans to finance house purchases, causing the equilibrium house price P 2l at t = 2 to decline further in order to clear the housing market. We have thus established the second of the four main results mentioned in the Introduction -higher bank leverage in the first period causes higher volatility in the second-period house price. 30 
The effect of the leverage choices of other banks on a bank's credit risk exposure
Next, we consider an extension of Proposition 1. Bank j's expected default cost at t = 2 from default on its deposits n 1j D j in the first period, defined as its "credit exposure," is:
Note that bank j's credit exposure depends on the house price P 2 at t = 2, which, in turn, depends on the leverage choices of all other banks in the first period (see Proposition 1). The fact that 30 Note that in our model, a bank's first-period retained earnings do not affect its second-period cost of lending.
Thus, P 2h is independent of the bank's first-period leverage. If we assume the bank's second-period cost of funds is decreasing in its first-period profit, then higher first-period leverage reduces the bank's lending cost in the second period conditional on a positive shock (B2 = B 2h ), which leads to a higher P 2h , thereby resulting in a larger impact of leverage on the equilibrium house price volatility. That is, such a change in the model will only make our result stronger.
all the banks' loans are backed by the same collateral (i.e., houses) engenders interconnectedness between otherwise-independent banks. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 2. For any given θ, as we compare across different equilibria corresponding to different sets of exogenous parameter values, each bank's credit risk exposure at t = 2 is increasing in the equilibrium leverage ratios of other banks.
This result highlights the role of bank leverage in contributing to interconnectedness between banks. It is important to note that this result holds even when we hold θ fixed, so the focus here is on variations in equilibrium leverage caused by other parameters (e.g., cost of equity). As the proposition indicates, when an equilibrium involves higher bank leverage than another equilibrium, the second-period house price declines more in response to a negative shock in the higher-leverage equilibrium. This adversely affects the value of collateral at all banks, so each bank's credit risk exposure is higher when the equilibrium leverage choices of all the other banks are higher.
Interconnectedness is generated by the impact of bank leverage on the value of common collateral.
This establishes the third of the four main results discussed in the Introduction.
Equilibrium in the first period
In the proceeding analysis, we took as given the first-period variables. We now examine the endogenous determination of these variables and hence the relationship between house prices, consumer leverage, and bank leverage in the first period.
Proposition 3. In the first period, consumer leverage L 1 /M 1 , bank leverage D j /L 1 ∀j, and house price P 1 are all increasing in θ, the probability of a positive fundamental shock to the value attached to home ownership by second-period homebuyers.
This is the correlated leverage result, the first of the four main results discussed in the Introduction. It asserts that as the probability of a high future value of home ownership increases, both borrowers and banks become more highly levered. The intuition is as follows. The demand for houses depends on a comparison that the consumer makes between the benefits of home ownership -the utility associated with home ownership and the expected house price appreciation during the period of ownership -with the price she pays for the house. Consider an increase in θ, the probability of a high value of second-period home ownership at t = 2. Ceteris paribus it makes house price appreciation more likely, causing aggregate housing demand to increase at t = 1. A marketclearing equilibrium is restored when aggregate housing demand is lowered via two channels: banks increase the interest rate they charge on loans in response to the increased demand for loans, and consumers compete more aggressively with each other to buy houses and bid up the price of houses.
The higher first-period house price causes the borrower, who has a fixed initial wealth endowment, to ask for a bigger bank loan, which leads to higher borrower leverage. Moreover, since an increase in θ diminishes the probability (1 − θ) of a decline in the house price at t = 2, the bank's credit risk declines because the borrower's loan repayment is predicated on the future value of the house as collateral. This reduces the marginal benefit of equity capital to the bank as a cushion to absorb credit risk, so the bank keeps lower capital precisely when borrowers are more highly leveraged, generating correlated leverage.
The increase in the first-period bank leverage makes bank payoffs more volatile -greater profits when the housing market experiences a positive shock and larger defaults on deposits when the housing market experiences a negative shock -but risk-neutral bank shareholders are unconcerned about this volatility. The increased magnitude of bank defaults conditional on a negative shock to the housing market increases the bank's second-period lending cost. This elevated cost causes banks to charge higher loan interest rate, which leads to lower consumer demand for houses. Consequently, the house price P 2l falls further, and the feedback from a low P 2l to a still lower P 2l via increased bank costs exacerbates the effect of a negative shock on P 2 .
Note that when θ increases, two effects are generated. First, as discussed above, banks increase their leverage and P 2l falls. Second, a higher θ means a lower probability (1 − θ) of P 2l being realized. These two effects have opposing influences on the first-period price P 1 . As long as the bank's lending cost in the second period is not too sensitive to first-period bank failures (which is guaranteed by Assumption 3), the decrease in P 2l due to the feedback effect of bank leverage is relatively small, so the direct effect of a higher θ dominates, and the first-period price P 1 goes up when θ increases.
Bank profits and competition: events at t = 0
In examining the equilibria at t = 1 and t = 2, we took as given the measure of banks in the industry. We now characterize the competitive equilibrium in the banking industry at t = 0 and endogenize the measure of banks, S/N . Banks compete in our model by choosing the interest rate they charge on loans, the number of loans they extend to consumers, and their capital structure.
Despite this, lending generates positive expected equilibrium profits. To see this, note that the expected profit of each bank in the second period is determined using (22), (28) and (31) as: 31 This result is consistent with Gertner (1985) who shows that when firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices and quantities and there are increasing marginal costs, the symmetric Nash equilibrium involves positive profits. The expected profit of each bank in the first period is determined using (21), (30) and (31) as:
which is also positive because the cost function for equity capital Λ(·) is increasing and convex with Λ(0) = 0.
An obvious question is: what specifically restrains an individual bank from increasing its lending
when it is earning positive expected profit? There are two factors. The first is the increasing marginal cost of lending discussed earlier. The second is the banks' concern that making more loans increases the magnitude of possible losses in the first period, leading to a higher cost of funds in the second period and lower second-period profits. 32 31 We drop the subscript j (which is used to indicate bank j) through out this subsection to simplify notation without adding confusion. 32 While this second factor contributes to positive expected bank profits, it is not a necessary factor. If α = 0, the second concern is absent, and yet banks earn positive expected profits due to the convexity of the cost of lending for each bank.
These positive profits will attract competing banks to enter the industry. Suppose this entry decision is made at t = 0 and entails a fixed cost, F > 0. Assume that there is a large measure of identical potential banks, each facing the payoffs described in (33) and (34) . We would intuitively expect that enough new banks will enter the industry to ensure that each bank's total expected profit, E(π 1 ) + E(π 2 ), net of the entry cost F , is zero. Formally, we add the following requirement to the equilibrium defined in Section 4.6: a bank enters the industry at t = 0 if and only if the total expected profit net of the entry cost is positive. Similarly, the expected second-period bank profit in (33) also decreases as the measure of entering banks increases. Thus, each bank's total expected profit declines as the measure of competing banks increases.
As long as the entry cost F is not too high to dissuade bank entry altogether, Lemma 2 ensures that the zero profit condition (under which the expected profit of each bank net of F equals zero)
uniquely determines the equilibrium measure of banks in the industry as that at which the marginal bank is indifferent between entering and not entering. Finally, we allow for ex ante heterogeneity among banks and examine the impact of too-big-to-fail protection received by large banks.
Intermediation thinning
One traditional intermediation function served by banks is to screen and discover the borrower's ability to generate income to repay the loan. Note that in our previous analysis, we have sidestepped this intermediation role played by banks by assuming that there is no uncertainty about the borrower's income from any source other than the proceeds from the sale of the house in the second period to repay the loan. We now extend our model to study the bank's intermediation role by adding the following structures.
1. For a fraction q ∈ (0, 1) of the first-period consumers (high-type borrowers), the income X 1 at t = 2 equals X (high income), where X > 0 is a constant, while for the remaining 1 − q fraction (low-type borrowers), the income X 1 equals 0 (low income). It is common knowledge at t = 1 that there is a fraction q of high-type borrowers and a fraction 1 − q of low-type borrowers and that the income levels are X and 0, respectively, but each consumer's type is her private information. Further, consumer types are independent of each other. To focus on bank screening in the first period, we assume that for each second-period borrower the income at t = 3 is nonstochastic and equals X 2 ≥ 0.
2. If a first-period borrower does not repay her loan in full at t = 2, the lending bank can claim a fraction µ of her income, where µ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant.
3. Banks specialize in pre-lending screening of the borrower's income-generation ability at t = 1.
The screening yields a signal σ with two possible values: a high value σ X and a low value σ 0 .
Let:
where ξ ∈ [1/2, 1] is the precision of bank screening, with larger values of ξ representing more informative screening. Each bank can independently choose the precision ξ of screening by investing c(ξ) in a screening technology. We assume c(ξ) is an increasing and convex function of ξ with c (1/2) = 0 and c (1) = ∞, so that banks will choose ξ between 1/2 and 1. Let
represent the posterior probability that a high-signal borrower is of the high type. This probability is increasing in ξ. We assume that the precision (ξ) and the investment in the screening technology (c(ξ)) are known only by the bank.
Banks classify borrowers into two groups, high-signal group and low-signal group, depending on the outcome of screening; banks may choose different loan provisions and/or loan terms across these two groups of borrowers. Lending to high-signal borrowers entails lower expected cost of default to banks than lending to low-signal borrowers, so banks prefer to lend to high-signal borrowers.
We assume that the measure of high-signal borrowers exceeds the supply of houses. 33 The banks lend only to high-signal borrowers in this case as we now explain. Since there are more high-signal borrowers than houses, not all high-signal borrowers can purchase houses, which means that high-signal borrowers must be indifferent in equilibrium between purchasing a house and not purchasing. 34 A bank will extend a loan to a low-signal borrower instead of a high-signal borrower only if doing so does not decrease its profit. However, a loan to a low-signal borrower has higher expected default costs, so low-signal borrowers must expect to absorb greater costs than do highsignal borrowers. Since both high-signal and low-signal borrowers derive the same benefit from 33 This requires Pr(σX)Sc > S, i.e., S/Sc < qξ
sufficient condition is that the ratio of the supply of houses over the measure of borrowers, S/Sc, does not exceed min(1/2, q). 34 If this were not the case and high-signal borrowers strictly preferred to purchase houses at the equilibrium price, there will be excess demand for houses and high-signal borrowers will bid up the house price. If, on the other hand, high-signal borrowers strictly prefer not to purchase houses at the equilibrium price, lack of any demand for houses will cause the house price to decline. None of these outcomes can be an equilibrium.
home ownership, this implies that low-signal borrowers must strictly prefer to not purchase houses if high-signal borrowers are indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing. 35 The average loan repayment received by a bank will be a weighted average of the repayment from high-type and low-type borrowers. When house prices are high, both types repay the loan in full. When houses prices are low, the bank gets P 2l from a low-type borrower, and P 2l + µX from a high-type borrower. As in the previous analysis, the average repayment received by the bank will be insufficient to pay depositors in full conditional on low house prices: P 2l + µηX < D j ∀j. 36 We now examine the bank's choice of screening precision. Bank j's expected profit in the first period, given by (21) in the main model without screening, now becomes:
The first term, n 1j {θR
is the expected repayment from the borrowers.
This consists of the promised repayment, R 1 L 1 , conditional on high house prices (probability θ), plus a term that includes the low house price P 2l and a fraction µ of the borrower's income X if she is high-type (probability η) conditional on a low house price (probability 1 − θ). The second term, n 1j L 1 , is the loan amount, the third term is the cost of equity capital, Λ(n 1j E j ), and the last term is the cost of screening, c(ξ). Bank j's expected profit in the second period in the state when B 2 = B 2k , given by (22) in the main model, now becomes:
In addition to determining the number of loans to extend and the capital structure, each bank now also chooses the precision with which to screen potential borrowers. We provide a comparative statics result pertaining to the equilibrium in this model. 35 Another way to see this is to compare the prices offered for houses by high-signal and low-signal borrowers.
The price offered by high-signal borrowers, as given by equation (A20) in the Appendix, is
The price offered by low-signal borrowers will be obtained by replacing η with the posterior probability of being a high-type borrower conditional on a low signal,
Since this probability is lower than η, the price offered by low-signal borrowers is lower because it accounts for the bank's higher expected cost of default on deposits. 36 If this were not the case in equilibrium so banks do not default on deposits, then a marginal reduction in screening reduces screening costs but has no effect on expected costs of default. This means the banks can increase expected profit by decreasing their investment in screening. However, this can not be true in an equilibrium.
Proposition 4.
Compare two equilibria with different exogenous parameter values. Then, the precision ξ with which banks screen is higher in the equilibrium in which the probability of a high fundamental home-ownership-value shock, θ, is lower, the sensitivity of the second-period lending cost to first-period default, α, is higher, the fraction of a borrower's income that the bank can claim, µ, is higher, and the difference between the incomes of the high-type and the low-type borrowers, X, is higher.
The first result is that a higher expected future house price (larger θ) dilutes the bank's incentive to screen the borrower's income-generation ability. The intuition is as follows. Note that the bank's credit risk depends on both the value of the house (collateral) and the fraction µ of the borrower's income available for loan repayment. Thus, a higher expected future house price diminishes the bank's reliance on borrower income in collecting the loan repayment, which in turn dilutes the bank's pre-lending screening incentive. That is, intermediation "thins" as house prices rise. Second, a lower sensitivity of the second-period lending cost to first-period default (smaller α) weakens the impact of the negative fundamental shock on the house price (P 2l ), which effectively increases the value of the collateral backing the loan; this increase in collateral value dilutes the bank's incentive to screen. Finally, the objective of screening is to distinguish between high-type and low-type borrowers because they earn different incomes and the bank captures a fraction of that income.
If the income difference between the two groups of borrowers is higher (larger X) or banks can capture a greater fraction of the borrower's income (larger µ), then identifying high-type borrowers is more valuable, leading banks to invest more in screening.
Bank leverage and house price cycles
Consider an extension of our model's two-period structure to one with many more than two periods.
In each period the consumer's utility from home ownership evolves stochastically, generating either a positive or a negative shock for the housing market. The shocks in all the periods are identical and independently distributed, where in each period the probability is θ for a positive shock and 1 − θ for a negative shock. However, initially no one knows the exact value of θ, except its prior probability distribution which is common knowledge. Banks and consumers update their beliefs about θ over time as they observe shocks in different periods. This specification is consistent with the empirical evidence that house price appreciation is highly positively autocorrelated (e.g., Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009), Shiller (1987, 1989) , and Goetzmann, Peng, and Yen (2009)). 37 In the first period, house price, bank leverage and consumer leverage are all determined based on agents' prior beliefs about θ. If a positive shock is realized in the second period, then the second-period house price increases above the first-period price. Moreover, banks and consumers revise upward their beliefs about θ, and both increase their leverage ratios in the second period.
Thus, house price and bank leverage move up in unison, until a negative shock is realized in the housing market. When a negative shock hits, the house price drops in that period, and banks and consumers revise downward their beliefs about θ, leading them to decrease their leverage ratios.
One interesting result is that the longer the housing market boom survives via a sequence of positive shocks, the larger is the adverse impact of a negative shock when it occurs. This is because banks attain very high leverage during the boom, and this high leverage magnifies the impact of even a small negative shock, resulting in a sharp decline in the house price.
By contrast, suppose there is a sequence of negative shocks in the initial periods, so the house price keeps declining initially. Banks keep revising downward their beliefs about θ, and as a result bank leverage also keeps declining. The impact of a future negative shock is thus smaller than that of previous negative shocks, because banks have low leverage. If a positive shock occurs after those initial negative shocks, the house price increase will be modest because banks' beliefs about θ are relatively low due to the initial negative shocks and banks also have relatively low leverage ratios.
In summary, we have the following two observations. First, if a large number of positive shocks occur initially, bank leverage rises to relatively high levels, and this may lead to a seemingly dramatic house price reversal once a negative shock occurs. The longer the boom in the housing market, the larger is the house price response to a negative shock. Second, if a large number of negative shocks occur initially, bank leverage declines, and the house price reversal in response to a positive shock is rather modest. That is, the reaction of house prices to shocks depends on previous shocks and may be asymmetric, and this is because house price dynamics are affected by bank leverage dynamics and vice versa. 37 Goetzmann, Peng, and Yen (2009) examine how forecasts of future increase in house price based on past price trends affect both the demand and supply of mortgages prior to the subprime crisis. In particular, past home price increases are associated with higher demand for loans to purchase homes that is manifested in higher subprime applications and loan-to-value ratios.
Impact of exogenous bank capital shocks
Consider a situation in which banks receive an exogenous shock that depletes their capital. This may be due, for example, to losses on assets other than home loans, or due to trading losses. This increases the cost of equity capital for banks and increases the cost of credit for borrowers, thereby reducing housing demand. Alternatively, banks may be unable to replace the lost equity capital so they reduce credit supply. In both cases, the first-period house price declines. Moreover, the negative shock to bank capital drives up bank leverage.
Thus, an exogenous negative shock to bank capital has two adverse effects on house prices.
First-period house prices fall due to diminished bank credit supply, and the higher bank leverage also causes the volatility of the second-period house price to go up.
Similarly, a positive exogenous shock to bank capital -via profits on other investments -causes a decrease in the bank's cost of equity capital or simply increases the available supply of loanable funds. The bank responds by increasing credit supply, and this leads to a higher P 1 . But since this increase in P 1 comes from cheaper credit rather than an expectation of a higher future house price, there is not an increase in bank leverage induced by house price dynamics. In fact, bank leverage declines due to the positive exogenous shock to bank capital. Consequently, the volatility of the second-period house price does not go up as P 1 increases.
We can now summarize the contrast between the result of our main model and this alternative scenario. In our main model, the exogenous shock is to the value second-period homebuyers are expected to attach to home ownership. When this shock is positive, it causes the first-period house price to increase, which then causes both bank and borrower leverage to rise. Thus, when the direction of causality runs from house price shocks to bank leverage, we find that higher initial house prices are correlated with: (i) higher bank leverage, (ii) higher borrower leverage, and (iii)
higher second-period house price volatility. When the direction of causality runs from shocks to bank capital to house prices, higher initial house prices are correlated with: (i) lower bank leverage,
(ii) higher borrower leverage, and (iii) lower second-period house price volatility. In this latter case, exogenous shocks to bank capital can induce price cycles in the housing market. A sufficiently high positive shock can even induce a house price bubble. Once the bubble has set in, then of course house prices can also affect bank leverage as banks may choose to reduce capital levels -by paying higher dividends -in response to an expectation of higher future house prices. The correlated leverage story we have told in this paper will then commence.
Ex ante capital regulation and ex post capital infusion
Since bank leverage affects the housing market, it is natural to ask how regulatory interventions that affect bank capital may influence house prices. We now discuss, within the context of our model, the consequences of ex ante bank capital regulation (at t = 1) and ex post capital infusion (at t = 2) by a regulator. Recall that bank equity capital acts as a cushion against default when the housing market experiences a negative shock (B 2 = B 2l ) at t = 2. But when the shock is positive (B 2 = B 2h ), the bank would have been better off if it had chosen a higher leverage ratio at t = 1.
Ex ante each bank makes its own capital structure decision by trading off the benefit of equity capital against its cost to maximize its own expected profit, and it assumes that its own capital structure decision has no impact on the house price. But we know that collectively the first-period leverage choices of banks do affect the second-period house price.
It should be noted that despite the effect of bank leverage on house prices, there is no rationale for regulatory intervention because there is no inefficiency per se due to the price impact of high bank leverage. So assume now that the bank regulator is concerned with house price dynamics and wishes to influence the dynamics by affecting banks' leverage choices. We ask: what is the economic consequence of the regulator imposing a capital requirement on banks? If this capital requirement is binding, then our earlier results show that it will help to elevate the expected equilibrium house price at t = 2 via an increase in bank capital levels. However, imposing a capital requirement higher than the bank's privately-optimal choice of equity capital reduces the bank's ex ante expected profit, which in turn will make the first-period loan more costly for the first-generation homebuyers. This will reduce the first-generation consumers' demand for houses, causing the house price at t = 1, P 1 , to decline. Thus, a binding capital requirement is likely to reduce the house price initially, but will also lower the likelihood of a further housing price decline. Whether a capital requirement is adopted depends on the objective of the regulator with respect to house price dynamics.
An alternative to capital requirement is for the regulator to infuse capital into the banks with a non-zero probability at t = 2 when the housing market is hit by a negative shock. A capital infusion reduces the banks' reliance on the capital market to raise (now very costly) equity to finance the second-period loan, which then helps to arrest any house price decline at t = 2. In this sense, an ex post capital infusion is similar to a capital requirement. However, these two methods of intervention may have very different ex ante consequences. To see that, note if the first-period homebuyers anticipate the government's capital infusion will occur ex post with a positive probability in the adverse state, they will attach a lower probability to a housing price decline in the second period.
This will cause housing demand to increase in the first period, and as a result the equilibrium house price at t = 1, P 1 , will increase. As for banks, the possibility of an ex post capital infusion reduces the marginal value of bank capital ex ante, and hence banks will choose higher leverage in the first period. However, this will increase the amount by which banks default on deposits if the housing market is hit by a negative shock at t = 2 and the government does not provide an ex post capital infusion. In turn, this increases the attractiveness of an ex post capital infusion from the standpoint of the government. Thus, an ex post government capital infusion could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, contributing to an increase in banking system leverage and fragility.
Cross-sectional heterogeneity among banks and TBTF
Banks are identical ex ante in our model. We now relax this specification and examine additional implications of the model. We extend the model in two ways. One is to introduce ex ante heterogeneity among banks. The second is to alter the cost of default for banks.
To introduce ex ante bank heterogeneity, we assume there are two types of banks: small banks and large banks. We assume that large banks are considered by regulators to be too-big-to-fail (TBTF), so the government will extend assistance to these banks if there is a negative shock in the housing market. As for the second extension of the model, we assume that defaulting on firstperiod deposits imposes two sorts of costs on the bank. One is the increase in the marginal cost of financing that is in our formal analysis. To that we now add a fixed cost which can be thought of as reflecting the cost of keeping higher capital and/or liquidity in order to raise post-default financing (at a higher marginal cost than prior to default). We assume that government assistance for large banks takes the form of liquidity and/or equity infusions, with the consequence that the fixed cost of default is decreased for large banks. Small banks do not have this form of "protection"
and hence face a higher cost of default relative to large banks. This extended model has numerous implications:
1. By reducing the ex post cost of default for large banks, a TBTF policy encourages them to take on higher leverage.
2. Conditional on a negative shock, this higher leverage among large banks exerts further downward pressure on the house price, P 2l , which increases the credit exposure for small banks that do not have TBTF protection and hence do not increase their leverage in the same way as large banks.
3. Anticipating this externality from the higher leverage of large banks, small banks respond by reducing their leverage. Thus, TBTF induces a greater capital structure dispersion in the cross-section of banks: large banks take on higher leverage, while small banks reduce their leverage. Viewed in this light, binding capital requirements help "level the playing field" by forcing large banks to keep lower leverage.
There may be more complex feedback loops. As small banks increase their capital, large banks may perceive lower risk of negative house price shocks, which may induce them to further boost their leverage. This, in turn, may cause small banks to perceive greater downside risk and choose higher capital.
Empirical Implications and Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the leverage decisions of borrowers and banks may move in unison -banks choose to become more highly levered when their borrowers are more highly levered. This finding is obtained in a setting in which bank loans are secured and borrowers' repayment of bank loans depends primarily on the stochastic value of the collateral backing the loan. Moreover, the probability distribution of the value of the collateral is affected by the aggregate lending behavior of banks, which in turn is dependent on their earlier capital structure decisions. Markets such as the one examined in this paper are also characterized by a link between bank leverage ratios and house prices -higher leverage ratios chosen by banks at a given point in time tend to increase the volatility of future house prices. That is, banks' capital structure decisions in the financial market have ramifications for equilibrium prices in the housing market. Further, bank leverage generates a form of interconnectedness among otherwise-independent banks in that each bank's credit risk exposure is increasing in the equilibrium leverage ratios of other banks. And there is also a transmission mechanism whereby house price dynamics impact the depth/quality of financial intermediation services provided by banks. Bull housing markets tend to dilute banks' screening incentives.
What empirical implications can we draw from this analysis? First, the main prediction of the model is that we should find in the data that high house prices, high borrower leverage and high bank leverage occur together. The recent home mortgage crisis is an example of this. Second, there will be a positive correlation between aggregate bank leverage in a given period and subsequent house price volatility. That is, house price volatility in any given period will be decreasing in appropriately-lagged bank capital. Third, because banks wish to operate with less capital during such periods, regulatory capital requirements will tend to be more binding for banks that engage in more secured lending and when the price of collateral is higher for borrowers. Finally, the dynamics of bank leverage can generate house price cycles. When there are only exogenous shocks to house prices, a sufficiently long sequence of positive house price shocks drive up bank leverage to such high levels that even a small number of subsequent negative shocks can precipitate a large reversal in house prices. When bank capital is also subject to exogenous shocks from sources other than house prices, we see that positive exogenous shocks to bank capital lead to higher initial house prices and lower future house price volatility. In both cases, the dynamics of bank leverage will have observable effects on the dynamics of house prices.
Explicit Expressions Corresponding to Assumptions 2 and 3:
Assumption 2ū
where
Further discussion of Assumption 2: Note that M 1 −B 1 is an upper bound on a first-period homebuyer's expected home equity, andū as defined in (A1) is the expected increase in home value if the second-period house price is high (P * 2h ) rather than low (P * 2l ), where P * 2h and P * 2l represent the house prices in the secondperiod if there is no default in the first period (obtained by setting α = 0 in (A4)). The inequality in Assumption 2, M 1 − B 1 <ū, implies that homeowners' expected equity is less than the expected upside in house price. This is possible only if the house price upon a negative shock in the housing market is insufficient to cover the loan repayment obligation. Thus, bank loans must be risky. Finally, it is optimal for banks to accept some risk of default on deposits to trade off against the costly equity capital. The proof of Proposition 1 shows that Assumption 2 is a sufficient condition for the following inequality:
which says: (i) when the housing market receives a positive shock (B 2 = B 2h ), the second-period house price is sufficiently high so that first-period homebuyers repay their loans (P 2h > R 1 L 1 ), whereas (ii) when the housing market receives a negative shock (B 2 = B 2l ), the second-period house price is sufficiently low so that first-period homebuyers default on their loans and the value of the houses seized by the banks is insufficient to pay off their depositors (
Proof of Lemma 1: Substituting equilibrium conditions (15) , (19) and (31) into (28) (with i = 2), removing the subscript j for symmetric equilibria (so D j ≡ D ∀j), and using the fact that
, we have:
Totally differentiating (A4) with respect to B 2 yields:
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The above equation simplifies to:
The coefficient of dP 2 /dB 2 is positive because αN L 2 < 1 by Assumption 3. This shows dP 2 /dB 2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we prove that Assumption 2 is a sufficient condition for (A2). Substituting (15) , (19) and (31) into (30) (with i = 1), we have:
where the second equality follows from (25) .
Suppose bank deposits are not risky, so
, and a higher value P 2h > P 2l solves (A4) for the case when B 2 = B 2h . So, D j ≤ P 2 .
Substituting this into (A7), we get P 1 = E(P 2 ) + B 1 ; substituting it into (25), we get E j = 0. Substituting D j ≤ P 2 into (A4) shows that P 2h = P * 2h and P 2l = P * 2l , where P * 2k is defined in Assumption 2. Substituting D j ≤ P 2 and E j = 0 into (30), we get L 1 = E(min(P 2 , R 1 L 1 )) ≤ P 2l , which implies R 1 L 1 ≤ P 2 . Substituting this condition into (19), we get M 1 = B 1 + E(P 2 ) − R 1 L 1 ≥ B 1 + E(P 2 ) − P 2l . Rearranging terms, we get M 1 − B 1 ≥ E(P 2 ) − P 2l = θ[P 2h − P 2l ] = θ[P * 2h − P * 2l ], which contradicts Assumption 2. Thus, we must have D j > P 2l . The remaining inequalities in (A2) are obvious.
We now proceed to prove the proposition. The desired results are comparative statics of symmetric equilibria, so we shall remove the subscript j in equilibrium equations. Consider the realization of B 2l at t = 2. Totally differentiating (A4) with respect to D yields:
But dL 2l /dD = dP 2l /dD, so the above equation simplifies to:
Note that the coefficient of dP 2l /dD on the left-hand-side (LHS) is positive because αN [P 2l − M 2 ] ≤ αN [E(P 3 ) + B 2l − M 2 ] < 1 (Assumption 3), whereas the right-hand-side (RHS) is negative. Thus, we must have dP 2l /dD < 0.
Now consider the realization of B 2h at t = 2. Substituting D ≤ P 2h from (A2) into (A4) shows P 2h = P * 2h
(defined in Assumption 2), which is independent of D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
As the first-period leverage ratio D/L 1 increases for all banks, the probability distribution of the second-period price P 2 shifts to the left (from Proposition 1), and the consequently lower P 2 increases bank j's credit exposure as defined in (32) .
Proof of Proposition 3:
The equilibrium is characterized by (2) , (15), (25) , (31) , (A7) and (A4), and is symmetric, so we shall remove the subscripts j from all equilibrium equations (so D j ≡ D and E j ≡ E ∀j)
when performing comparative statics analysis.
Incorporating P 2l < D ≤ P 2h from (A2) into (A7) and totally differentiating it with respect to θ yield:
Note that P 2h = P * 2h (as shown in the proof of Proposition 1) is independent of θ. Substituting dP 2h /dθ = 0 into the above equation and rearranging terms, we have:
Consider the realization of B 2l at t = 2. Totally differentiating (A4) with respect to θ yields:
Substituting (31) into (25) and totally differentiating with respect to θ, we get:
Substituting (2) into the above equation yields:
Substituting the above equation into (A12) yields:
We prove by contradiction that dP 1 /dθ > 0. Suppose dP 1 /dθ ≤ 0. Then, substituting dP 1 /dθ = 0 into (A11) provides an upper bound on dP 2l /dθ, while substituting dP 1 /dθ = 0 into (A15) provides a lower bound on dP 2l /dθ. For sufficiently small values of α, the lower bound exceeds the upper bound (for α = 0, the lower bound is 0, while the upper bound is negative) which yields a contradiction. Thus, P 1 must be increasing in θ for sufficiently small α (as long as α < α max , the upper bound imposed in Assumption 3).
Then, (A15) shows that dP 2l /dθ < 0. Substituting this into (A13) and (A14) shows that D is increasing in θ while E is decreasing in θ, so bank leverage D/L 1 is increasing in θ.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The measure S/N of banks increases as N declines. From (25) , N E is independent of N (and equals zero) if α = 0, so E(π 1 ) in (34) is independent of N . Substituting α = 0 into (A4), we get:
The right-hand-side (RHS) of the above equation is independent of N . If N L 2 is weakly decreasing in N , then L 2 and consequently the left-hand-side (LHS) of the above equation are strictly decreasing in N , which is a contradiction. So N L 2 must increase with N . This means that E(π 2 ) in (33) is increasing in N and decreasing in the measure of banks, S/N . Thus, E(π 1 ) + E(π 2 ) is decreasing in S/N .
Proof of Proposition 4:
The equilibrium conditions incorporate heterogeneity among consumers by allowing each homeowner's loan repayment to be contingent on her income. Equation (19) for equilibrium in the housing market becomes:
equation (25) for the optimal capital structure becomes:
and equation (30) for the optimal loan amount becomes:
Substituting (A17), (A18) and (15) into the above equation, we get:
In is given by (36) , and E(π 2jh ) and E(π 2jl ) are given by (37) . Application of the Envelope Theorem shows that dE(π 1j + π 2j )/dξ j = ∂E(π 1j + π 2j )/∂ξ j , because bank j chooses other choice variables to maximize its expected profits and aggregate variables (P i and R i ) are not affected by bank j's choice of ξ j . Then, in a symmetric equilibrium where ξ j = ξ ∀j, the equilibrium first-order-condition for a bank's choice of screening precision is:
The net marginal benefit of an increase in ξ equals µN X[1
, which is increasing in α, µ, and X but decreasing in θ, so the optimal ξ is increasing in α, µ, and X but decreasing in θ. Ƃ Each atomistic first-period consumer chooses whether to buy a house or not. Consumers attach value to home ownership and maximize expected utility:
Ƃ First-period house price, , is endogenously determined.
Ƃ Atomistic banks compete to lend to first-period homebuyers. All loans are secured by houses.
Ƃ Each bank chooses its first-period capital structure, in the face of complete deposit insurance, costly bank equity and the potential impact of the first-period default to its cost of lending in the second period.
Ƃ First-period homebuyers sell their houses.
Ƃ Each second-period consumer chooses whether to buy a house or not.
Ƃ Second-period house price, , is endogenously determined by secondperiod housing demand, housing supply and credit supply.
Ƃ Bank loans to first-period homebuyers are settled.
Ƃ Each bank experiences loss/profit and consequent shock to its second-period lending cost.
Ƃ Banks compete to lend to second-period homebuyers.
Ƃ Second-period homebuyers sell their houses.
Ƃ Banks' loans to second-period homebuyers are settled. 
